Water resource managers often tout the potential of potable water reuse to provide a reliable, 2 local source of drinking water in water-scarce regions. Despite data documenting the ability 3 of advanced treatment technologies to treat municipal wastewater effluent to meet existing 4 drinking water quality standards, many utilities face skepticism from the public about potable 5 water reuse. Prior research on this topic has mainly focused on marketing strategies for 6 garnering public acceptance of the process. This study takes a broader perspective on the 7 adoption of potable water reuse based on concepts of societal legitimacy, which is the 8 generalized perception or assumption that a technology is desirable or appropriate within its 9 social context. To assess why some potable reuse projects were successfully implemented 10 while others confronted fierce public opposition, we performed a series of 20 expert 11 interviews and reviewed in-depth case studies from potable reuse projects in California. 12 Results show that a legitimated potable water reuse project in Orange County, California 13 engaged in a portfolio of strategies that addressed three main dimensions of legitimacy, while 14 other proposed projects that faced extensive public opposition relied on a smaller set of 15 legitimation strategies that focused near-exclusively on the development of robust water 16 treatment technology. Widespread legitimation of potable water reuse projects, including 17 direct potable water reuse, may require the establishment of a portfolio of standards, 18 procedures and possibly new institutions. 19 42 have floundered when actors outside of the control of the project's advocates used 43 terminology that was unfavorable. 11 44 Research based on public acceptance does not incorporate the full complexity of the 45 issues surrounding new technology adoption, 22 and may overestimate the ability of project 46 proponents to affect community support by targeting individual perceptions of water reuse. 23 47 Cognitive Legitimacy (Type 3 Legitimacy), is not based on conscious evaluation, 129 but rather on compliance with taken-for-granted routines and cultural beliefs ("the way we do 130 things"). 28,31 It includes two main components: The first, comprehensibility, occurs if an 131 innovation fits into prevailing cultural assumptions and daily-life habits of end users (e.g., 132 support for bottled recycled water if it looks and tastes like established bottled water brands). 133 The second component, taken-for-grantedness, occurs when the innovation meshes with end 134 users' deep cognitive frames that are not consciously questioned (e.g., people familiar with 135 solid waste recycling may think of potable water reuse as another desirable form of 136 recycling).
Introduction
Limited water resources and increasingly complex societal demands require water 21 managers to develop innovative solutions to water challenges. 1 However, changing practices 22 in the water sector is notoriously difficult because the social and institutional contexts, 23 including the rules, norms, and conventions that govern decision-making, often hinder 24 diffusion of innovative technologies or new systems of governance. 2 Water recycling, and in 25 particular recycling for potable water reuse, illustrates the ways in which social and 26 institutional concerns can affect technology adoption. 3, 4 Potable water reuse is defined here as 27 the practice of intentionally returning highly treated municipal wastewater to the public water 28 supply. 5,6 29 Some water resource managers and consulting engineers tout the potential of potable 30 water reuse to provide a local, reliable water supply in water-scarce regions. [7] [8] [9] [10] Potable water 31 reuse can be less costly than alternatives, such as desalination or importing additional water, 32 and can meet or exceed existing water quality standards. 5 However, these factors are not 33 always sufficient for obtaining public support. 11 Proponents of potable water reuse have 34 mainly framed this issue as one of a lack of public acceptance, [12] [13] [14] which can be defined as 35 the public's passive acquiescence to the expert knowledge of water managers and engineers. 15 36 Previous research has addressed the lack of public acceptance of potable water reuse 7,10-16 37 by focusing on the benefits of selecting positive terminology to describe the practice, 38 development of communication strategies, characterizing populations that accept potable 39 water reuse, and development of public education campaigns. 11, 13, [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] This research has 40 yielded an improved understanding of the language and strategies for marketing potable water 41 reuse. Nonetheless, in several high-profile cases, technologically-sound potable reuse projects Previous studies have shown that water authorities and developers tend to approach public 48 acceptance in terms of persuading the public to accept water reuse by means of provision of 49 more technical information. This occurs despite evidence that members of the public are 50 interested in a broad range of information about the project including social and 51 environmental costs and benefits, institutional structure, risk comparisons to other activities, 52 regulatory systems, and analysis of alternative solutions. 24 Previous research suggests a public 53 acceptance paradigm for understanding perceptions of potable water reuse is too narrowly 54 framed, but stops short of proposing an empirically-grounded, comprehensive framework. 15,25 55 Other scholars place a public acceptance mode of expert outreach for water management, in 56 which experts choose what they perceive as the most desirable solution and convince the 57 community of its relevance and importance, as a hallmark of an old paradigm of unsustainable 58 water systems that is no longer useful in the twenty-first century. 26 
59
A more robust framework for engaging the public in issues of potable water reuse based 60 on societal legitimacy 27 may address some of the shortcomings in public acceptance research. 61 Legitimacy -a key concept in sociology and innovation studies -acknowledges that creating 62 widespread trust in an innovation depends on strategies that not only target individual 63 psychology, but that also address aggregate sectorial and societal rules, norms and 64 conventions. [27] [28] [29] Sociology scholars define legitimacy as "a generalized perception or 65 assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 66 socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions". 30 In its sociological 67 definition, legitimacy can be assessed by the "taken-for-grantedness" of a particular 68 technology, implementing organization, or process. 28 
69
Establishing legitimacy involves the process of embedding a new technology in the 70 shared social belief systems, moral standards and cultural conventions of a given group, 28, 31, 32 71 through a set of strategies that go beyond traditional public relations or educational outreach. 72 Establishment of legitimacy may require the institutions responsible for the technology, also 73 known as the implementing organizations, to undergo fundamental changes. Some of these 74 changes may challenge the traditional authority of water providers, as they may require 75 sharing power through collaborative decision-making and consideration of heterogeneous 76 public values. Water utilities cannot build legitimacy for potable water reuse based on hollow 77 promises. Superficial interventions undertaken to approximate the legitimacy framework 78 presented in this paper and manipulate public perceptions of legitimacy will likely not create 79 stable legitimacy, but rather foster mistrust in the management's true intentions. Because 80 legitimation is a societal process, it is most stable when it is established in public discourse. 81 It is important to note that establishment of legitimacy for a particular technology, like 82 potable reuse, may not be possible in places where the technology does not mesh with the 83 values and social beliefs of a given community. A deeper understanding of legitimacy and the 84 legitimation process can, however, help water engineers find solutions for water supply and 85 wastewater disposal that are most appropriate for a given community. It can also help prevent 86 investment in technological infrastructure that will encounter stark public opposition. 87 The case of potable water reuse in California illustrates the process of legitimation, 88 which has relevance to a wide range of emerging environmental technologies. California has a 89 long history of potable reuse, 33 from which we draw and examine examples of both successful 90 and unsuccessful attempts to legitimize the practice. We extend the sociological definitions of 91 legitimacy to include innovative technologies and the institutional systems surrounding 92 them 27 and define a comprehensive analytical framework for the legitimation process of 93 potable water reuse and innovations in general (see Table 1 ). The present paper complements 94 another publication (Binz et al., submitted) , which focuses on a detailed process account of 95 technology legitimation in an innovation system context. 3 
97
Analytical Framework for Legitimacy 98 Legitimacy is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that can be differentiated into several 99 key types. Suchman's comprehensive framework (1995) divides legitimacy into three generic 100 types: pragmatic, moral and cognitive, 28 which we term Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 101 legitimacy, respectively. Each of these types can be further grouped into several distinct 6 dimensions. Table 1 illustrates our application of legitimacy concepts to innovative 103 technologies in general and potable reuse in particular.
104
Pragmatic Legitimacy (Type 1 Legitimacy) is based on the end user's self-interested 105 calculations about the direct benefits that can be derived from the innovation. 28 Its first 106 component, exchange legitimacy, is derived from the end user's perceived gain of a good or 107 service from the innovation (e.g., support for a water reuse project based on the notion that 108 adoption of the technology may provide a means for maintaining golf courses without 109 restrictions on water use). The second component is influence legitimacy, which occurs when 110 end users perceive an implementing organization to be responding directly to their personal 111 interests 28 (e.g., support of a potable reuse project arising from the participation of community 112 members on the project's advisory board). The third component, dispositional legitimacy, 113 occurs when an innovation is managed by an established, trustworthy entity (e.g., faith in a 114 water utility with a professional reputation to responsibly manage a potable reuse project).
115
Moral Legitimacy (Type 2 Legitimacy) is established when an innovation 116 corresponds to societal values and broader societal welfare. 28 The first component, 117 consequential legitimacy, occurs when proponents of an innovation demonstrate that it has a 118 strong record of providing beneficial outcomes for society (e.g., support for potable water 119 reuse systems that have operated for a long time without problems). The second component, An innovation is considered wholly legitimized when a majority of the population 141 takes it for granted, and any opponents are no longer able to achieve a serious response from 142 community members. Nonetheless, individual projects may lose credibility even after 143 legitimacy is established for the sector if they do not continue to employ legitimation 144 strategies for their specific project. 28 
145
Achieving legitimacy for new technologies requires development of all three types of 146 legitimacy: if only Type 1 legitimacy is established, as is often done in acceptance-based 147 public outreach campaigns, the project might be accepted temporarily, but legitimacy will 148 likely erode when end users start questioning whether or not the Type 2-related procedures 149 and institutional structures that support the innovation are legitimate. Similarly, if only Type 150 2 legitimacy is emphasized, the public may trust that the innovation is managed with 151 competency, but end users may question the usefulness of the innovation to the community. 152 Complete legitimacy thus requires a comprehensive portfolio of legitimation strategies that 153 address each of these dimensions. 154 We hypothesized that the more complete the legitimation portfolio of a utility involved in 155 potable water reuse projects, the more likely the project will be to avoid organized public 156 opposition or rejection by the community. We assessed the legitimation portfolio of 157 California's potable water reuse projects-and identified gaps therein-to provide insight into 158 the ways in which communities support or reject technological innovation in the water sector.
159

Methods
160
To address the legitimacy of potable water reuse we examined a case study of legitimated 161 potable reuse, and compared it with cases of several other projects in which California water 162 utilities failed to implement potable water reuse. 163 The Orange County Water District (OCWD), in Orange County, California, was chosen 164 as a case of legitimate potable water reuse. The water district has practiced potable water 165 reuse since 1976, when it began to inject highly treated municipal wastewater into the 166 region's groundwater aquifer. [33] [34] [35] [36] This system was expanded from 15 MGD (57,000 m 3 /day) 167 to 70 MGD (265,000 m 3 /day) in 2008. The present advanced treatment system configuration, 168 called the Groundwater Replenishment System (GWRS), sources municipal effluent from a 169 nearby wastewater treatment plant, then uses microfiltration, reverse osmosis and an advanced 170 oxidation process to further treat the water. The treated water is then pumped into recharge 171 basins and injection wells, where it mixes with local groundwater. 37 The GWRS contributes to 172 drinking water supplies for more than 2 million people. 37 There has been no organized public 173 opposition to GWRS (Interview 19). The GWRS is considered a best practice in the potable 174 water reuse community and serves as the basis for the technological design of several other 175 potable water reuse projects. 3 
176
Other cases considered include the Dublin-San Ramon Services District's proposed 177 potable reuse project, which failed due to public opposition after the facility was built; San 178 Diego's water recycling project, which the public vehemently opposed in the 1990's; and the 179 Santa Clara Valley Water District's proposed potable water reuse project. 180 We conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with 20 key, expert stakeholders who 181 were deeply involved with implementing potable water reuse in California (as well as 182 nationally and globally). Interviewees included managers and executives of water and 183 wastewater utilities, public relations consultants, regulators, academics, and engineering 184 consultants. We used respondent-driven sampling techniques, 38 including snowball 185 sampling, 39 to identify and interview the small group of people who have been most 186 influential in the development of potable water reuse systems in California. We designed 187 interview questions to elicit responses about the legitimation strategies applied in single 188 projects as well as in the wider potable water reuse community (see Supporting Information, 189 section 1). We transcribed interviews, then codified them using MaxQDA qualitative data 190 analysis software and analyzed them for mentions or allusions to dimensions of legitimacy. 191 We triangulated interview data with relevant reports and white papers, utility public outreach 192 information, scientific publications, and newspaper articles (see Supporting Information,   193 section 2). We grounded the case studies in historical research regarding local experiences 194 with and attitudes towards water use and reuse. We used perspectives presented in local news 195 articles and editorials as well as the presence or absence of organized public opposition 196 groups as proxy measures for user opinion. 40 Both are standard proxy measures for user 197 legitimacy in institutional sociology literature (see e.g. Geels and Verhees 2011). 41 Table 2 . these different groups were working together to make sure that needs were met, 234 that we were on point, that we were spending money wisely, and that we were ultimately enhanced its dispositional legitimacy: Instead of hiding the problem, the 244 management decided to publicly disclose it, and proved to both regulators and the public 245 that they were competent in dealing effectively with the contamination (Interview 5). 246 "We were actually causing the problem in the water we were injecting. Some In a press conference, OCWD representatives explained what had happened and 255 how they were working to address the problem. They also set the NDMA exposure in 256 context by explaining how people are routinely exposed to the compound in food and 257 beverages (Interview 17). 258 As a result of the utility's transparent communication strategy, the media 259 described the story as a minor incident that was in the process of being fixed, rather than 260 as a severe threat to public health. In describing the NDMA problem, the Los Angeles running it is applying the right procedures to guarantee safety. 28 OCWD was addressing 292 this issue by establishing strict water quality testing procedures and monitoring for 335 293 chemicals, instead of just the 122 compounds required of them by the regulator. 44 
294
In addition, OCWD developed standard operating procedures for their water reuse 295 system. They established protocols for routine operating conditions and in the event of an 296 upset and explained these to end users in tours (Interview 1). In addition to providing 297 clarity to the plant's operators, this further improved procedural legitimacy of the 298 organization. 299 Third, OCWD consistently emphasized that it had the right physical infrastructure 300 in place to guarantee safe operations (structural legitimacy). Other professionals were 301 impressed with how the utility maintained cutting-edge technologies for water treatment 302 and source control, employed more than 200 staff, operated 24/7 and built a state-of-the-art water quality laboratory directly on-site (Interviews 1, 2, 15 ). Interviews reveal the 304 existence of a lab inside the utility was effective in signaling structural legitimacy to the 305 general public (Interview 17). 306 OCWD's management staff also reinforced personal legitimacy by personally 307 speaking to the public in outreach campaigns: 308 "It wasn't the consultants who did the speeches. It was staff or board members. 309 We found that the people, the general public, gravitate much more to the personal reuse without an intervening natural barrier like an aquifer or a lake). 47 The process is 364 described in more detail in another publication. 3 In the following section, we use the 365 legitimacy framework to analyze the legitimation strategies that have been used by failed 366 potable reuse projects as well as by the coalition of proponents of potable water reuse. Potable water reuse advocacy coalitions subsequently funded several research projects 390 on ways to improve exchange legitimacy for potable reuse (Interview 7). 49 Research results 391 suggested that framing planned potable reuse as an improvement over existing water supplies, 392 many of which employ de facto reuse (i.e., a practice in which water from a municipal 393 wastewater treatment plant discharges into a river or lake that is used as the drinking water 394 source for a downstream community) 5 was an effective means of increasing exchange 395 legitimacy and public support. 46, 50 In conjunction with the research projects, the WateReuse 396 Association created an educational video, called "Downstream," to explain de facto water 397 reuse and try to create exchange legitimacy for the broader potable water reuse sector. 50 Advocates for potable water reuse also developed vocabulary and imagery that related 478 potable reuse to positively connoted cognitive frames like 'recycling,' and attempted to 479 standardize these terms across engineers and utilities advocating for potable reuse (Interview 480 7). 14 While environmentalists tend to oppose desalination projects, 61 in part because of a 481 perception that creating new water sources in arid regions will encourage growth in areas that 482 ecologically cannot support an increasingly large population, they tend to support water 483 recycling because it ties in with their ideals of living in closed-loop systems-though potable 484 water reuse projects also effectively create a new water source that could have the same 485 growth effect in water-scarce regions (Interview 11). 486 In addition, the WateReuse Foundation employed surveys and focus groups to 487 understand which vocabulary words and images would resonate well with cognitive 488 frames of water users. They found that wording related to the origin of the water (i.e., 489 wastewater, sewage, treated wastewater) resonated poorly, whereas terms that emphasize 490 the high quality of the produced water (e.g., purified water) were more acceptable. 14 
491
However, proponents of potable reuse at different water utilities continue to use a variety 492 of terms to describe the practice (Interviews 7, 11). Several key observations stand out when comparing legitimacy of potable water reuse at 505 OWCD and other potable water reuse projects in California. First, a legitimacy framework for 506 assessing potable water reuse projects, in combination with an understanding of the history 507 and values of local residents in the project area, appears to be useful in explaining adoption of 508 potable water reuse. OCWD's success in establishing legitimacy for potable water reuse 509 cannot be ascribed purely to its innovative technological approach or to its constituents' 510 passive acceptance of expert opinion. OCWD employed a comprehensive portfolio of 511 legitimation strategies both deliberately and by chance, which fostered public trust in the 512 utility and in the practice of potable reuse. 513 When the practice of potable water reuse began to spread beyond OCWD, many 514 engineers assumed building structurally sound treatment and monitoring systems would 515 suffice for establishing public trust in potable reuse. This approach did create structural 516 legitimacy, but this attribute could not compensate for other shortcomings in the legitimacy 517 portfolio such as the lack of community representation in decision-making and the lack of 518 trust in the utility's ability to manage risk. These experiences show that potable reuse projects 519 seeking societal legitimacy cannot establish it by simply copying the treatment train from 520 OCWD; they must also adopt a comprehensive legitimation portfolio approach. 521 In contrast to OCWD, many other potable water reuse projects in California have had The legitimacy portfolio perspective presented in this paper is relevant beyond the 551 Californian potable water reuse case. It can be applied to potable reuse systems world-wide, 552 to other innovations in the water sector (e.g., point-of-use treatment or on-site water 553 recycling) or potentially to innovation in other sectors, like energy or transportation. Our 554 findings suggest that establishment of legitimacy for an innovation like potable water reuse 555 relies upon a balanced and comprehensive portfolio of strategies that address all three types of 556 legitimacy. These legitimation strategies include elements like collaborative public 557 engagement in planning and decision-making, which are outside the realm of the 'public 558 acceptance' paradigm traditionally employed in water projects. A fourth type of legitimacy, 559 regulatory legitimacy, 31 has not been explicitly separated in this research from the other three 560 types. The role of regulatory legitimacy in potable water reuse merits future research. 561 These findings do not imply that there will never be opposition to potable water reuse 562 projects if all legitimacy dimensions are addressed. In fact, potable water reuse may turn out 563 not to be legitimate in some communities, especially if it does not satisfy the community's 564 criteria for meeting all three aspects of legitimacy, and other options for water supply and/or 565 wastewater disposal may be more appropriate. Rather, the broader the legitimacy portfolio, 566 the lower the probability that potable water reuse projects will move forward to a level of 567 financial investment in physical infrastructure in places where opposition to the project will 568 prevent it from coming to fruition. These results also show that many dimensions of 569 legitimacy cannot be created by changes in vocabulary or promotional campaigns alone, 570 which are hallmarks of marketing in a public acceptance paradigm. Establishing legitimacy 571 may require wide-ranging structural, procedural or institutional changes -which ideally 572 emulate pre-legitimized practices from other sectors. 573 It is important to note that ideas of legitimacy are culturally specific. What constitutes 574 exchange legitimacy in one place may not be considered valid elsewhere. For example, 575 having more water to enable suburban growth was legitimate in southern California but it 576 helped create opposition to the Dublin San Ramon water reuse project in northern California. 
